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THE COPYRIGHTABILITY OF SPORTS
CELEBRATION MOVES: DANCE FEVER OR
JUST PLAIN SICK?
INTRODUCTION

United States copyright law seeks to protect original works of authorship
in order to promote learning and knowledge. Creating a body of law with such
an objective, however, was not a novel idea when the Framers incorporated
the Copyright Clause (hereinafter, the "Clause") into the United States
1
Constitution.
2
The origins of United States copyright law can be traced to England.
Originally, the English government used copyright law as a means for
"censorship and press control."'3 It was not until the introduction of the
printing press, in 1476, that the modem form of copyright law began to take
4
shape.
Following many informal attempts to protect authors' works, 5 the first
officially recognized copyright act was instituted in 1710, when Parliament
enacted the Statute of Anne. 6 Resembling current copyright law, the Statute
"granted an assignable right to authors to control the publication of their
writings.... Instead of a tool of censorship, the Statute of Anne was
7
expressly meant to be. .. '[a]n act for the encouragement of learning.'
The Framers of the United States Constitution followed the precedent
established by Parliament when they created Article I, § 8, cl.8 of the
Constitution, 8 the Copyright Clause.9 The Clause requires that copyright serve

1. See JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 27-28
(2002); Copyright History, IUP INFO, at http://reference.allrefer.com/encyclopedia/C/copyrighhistory.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2004).
2. COHEN ETAL., supra note 1, at 25.

3. Id.
4. See id.at 25-26; Win. Tucker Griffith, Note: Beyond the Perfect Score: Protecting RoutineOrientedAthleticPerformance With Copyright Law, 30 CONN. L. REv. 675, 683-84 (1998).
5. See COHEN ET AL., supra note 1,at 26; Griffith, supra note 4, at 684.
6. COHEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 27; Griffith, supra note 4, at 684.
7. COHEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 27. See generally Griffith, supra note 4, at 684.
8. COHEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 27-28; see Copyright History, supra note 1.

9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8.
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a public purpose, namely "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
10
Arts."'
The reach of copyright protection today, as detailed in section 102(a) of
the Copyright Act (hereinafter, the "Act"), extends to authors' "literary
musical works... [, and] choreographic works.""1 However,
works..,
despite sport's exponential growth and its significant influence on modem
protection for an author's original
culture, the Act does not expressly afford
12
and creative sports celebration moves.
This comment asserts that sports celebration moves are copyrightable.
When contrasted with more traditional choreographic works, which are
regularly afforded copyright protection, sports celebration moves possess a
quantum of "originality" tantamount to that of those more typical works.
Moreover, sports celebration moves can be "fixed" just as easily as more
conventional choreographic works. Thus, sports celebration moves satisfy the
conditions required of copyrighted works just as effectively as the more
traditional, and oft protected choreographed works.
Part I of this comment discusses the continual growth and cultural
importance of sport throughout history. Further, Part I offers several reasons
why sports celebration moves should be protected by copyright law.
In Part II, this comment explores the origins of copyright law. Though the
foundation of copyright law existed well before the United States Copyright
Clause, the purpose of copyright law remains the same - to protect original
works of authorship that promote societal progress. Part II also discusses the
furtherance of copyright's purpose through the requirements put forth by
Congress in the Copyright Act.
Part III examines the copyrightability of sports celebration moves by
applying the stringent requirements set forth in the Copyright Act to these
moves. In addition, this section addresses the policy considerations concerning
the copyrightability of sports celebration moves.

10. COHEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 28 (emphasis omitted); see Copyright History, supra note 1.
11. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2002).
12. Id.; see Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 846 (2d Cir. 1997). Sports
celebration moves are original, choreographed moves designed by an athlete for the purpose of
celebrating his or her athletic feats. Sports celebration moves, though generally related to sports
moves, should, nevertheless, be considered an entirely different species of sports move for purposes
of copyright protection analysis. They are creative, original, and unique moves that serve only as a
tangential part of any game. Whereas, ordinary sports moves are standardized, commonly performed
moves that serve a functional role in an athletic competition.
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I. THE CONTINUAL GROWTH AND IMPORTANCE OF SPORT: PRESENTING A
NEED FOR COPYRIGHT PROTECTION

Sport's cultural impact was felt in even the earliest civilizations. Its
continual influence has led to exponential growth in media coverage and has
had vast economic implications in modem society. This section will address
sport's influence on society and why its continued growth is presenting a need
for copyright protection of athletes' sports celebration moves.
A. Sport's CulturalImpact Throughout History
Sport's cultural influence helped shape many of the world's earliest
societies. 13 Its meaningful role in ancient societies was perhaps best
exemplified in ancient Greece. From the first Olympic Games in 776 B.C.,
until their demise in 393 A.D., 14 Grecian citizens, including many who were
from cities located at the farthest reaches of the Greek world, regularly trekked
to Olympia to celebrate and watch the Olympic Games. 15 The Games were so
greatly revered that "[e]ven in times of war, an Olympic truce would usually
16
allow participants safe travel to and from the games."'
To the Grecian people, the Olympics signified more than mere contests
determining physical superiority. 17 These "[s]ports festivals were created as
religious rituals to honor the gods."' 18 Further, the Olympics had a momentous
impact on societal growth and learning. 19 At these Games, "diverse segments
of the populace [would gather], permitting exchanges in philosophy, art,
20
politics, and economics."
Though much has changed since ancient times, sport's significant cultural
influence remains. Like the ancient Grecians, today's societies place sports on
a pedestal. However, unlike sport in ancient civilization, sport in the U.S. is

13. See generally Griffith, supra note 4, at 676.
14. JOHN R. GERDY, SPORTS: THE ALL-AMERICAN ADDICTION xix (2002).

15. Id.
16. Id.; see The Importance & Demise of the Olympic Games, AROUND GREECE GUIDES, at
http://www.aroundgreece.com/olympics-importance-demise.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2004).
17. See GERDY, supra note 14, at xix; Griffith, supra note 4, at 676. See generally The
Importance of the Olympic Games, supra note 16.
18. GERDY, supra note 14, at xix; see Paul Cartledge, Olympic Self-Sacrifce, HISTORY TODAY,
at http://www.findarticles.com/cf 0/m 1373/10-50/66157027/p I/article.jhtml?term=truce+Olympics
(last visited Mar. 15, 2004).
19. GERDY, supra note 14, at xix; see The Importance ofthe Olympic Games, supra note 16.
20. GERDY, supra note 14, at xix.
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no longer respected because of an affiliated religious significance. 2 1 Rather,
the games and athletes of today are revered because fans are continually awed
by the grace and skill with which the most progressive, exciting athletic moves
are performed by athletes who demonstrate an ever-greater ability to jump
22
higher, run faster, and throw farther.
Further, the explosion of media coverage of athletic events has impacted
modem culture ubiquitously. Due to the around-the-clock coverage by twentyfour hour sports television networks like ESPN, fans have unprecedented
access to games involving a cornucopia of teams competing in numerous
professional and amateur sport leagues, continuously updated sports news, and
talk shows offering discussion about the most exciting players and the "big
games." 23 The programming offered by these "all-sport" channels, as well as
new media like the Internet, 24 allows fans to witness daily, if not hourly, all of
the superior plays performed by the most accomplished athletes, from the
convenience of their homes.
B. The Economic Impact
25
"Sport is not just a game it is big business."

The sports industry is a multibillion-dollar industry. 26 Whether it be
through purchasing shoes similar to those of a basketball star2 7 or through
buying tickets to the "game of the week," 2 8 fans spend large sums of money in
an attempt to witness, as well as to identify themselves with the seemingly
29
magical moves of their favorite athletes.
21. See generally Griffith, supra note 4, at 676; Loren J. Weber, Something in the Way She
Moves: The Casefor Applying Copyright Protection to Sports Moves, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS
317, 318 (2000).
22. See Griffith, supra note 4, at 677.
23. See Weber,supra note 21, at 325; see also GERDY,supra note 14, at 21.
24. See Massive Revenue Growth Forecastedfor Internet Sports Sites, SCREEN DIGEST, at
http://www.screendigest.com/press-sportonthei.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2003).
25. Id. (quoting Rachael Church, the author of the Report, Sport on the Internet); see William S.
Kern, Introduction,in THE ECONOMICS OF SPORTS 1 (William S. Kern ed., 2000).
26. See Massive Revenue Growth Forecastedfor Internet Sports Sites, supra note 24; Sports
Industries
to
USA,
AUSTRALIAN
TRADE
COMMISSION,
at
http://www.austrade.gov.au/ci-display/0,1257,ContentGroup%253Dcountryindust%2526ContentTyp
e%253Dcountryindust%2526ContentSection%253Dmajorproduct% (last visited Mar. 29, 2003).
27. GERDY, supra note 14, at 33.
28. See Kern, supra note 25.
29. See GERDY,supra note 14, at 33; Kern, supra note 25. See generally Sports Industries to
USA, supra note 26.
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The demand for these products results in immense profits from lucrative
endorsement contracts for the most celebrated athletes like Tiger Woods and,
recently retired, Michael Jordan. 30 Michael Jordan, who served as the
measuring stick for all other endorsed athletes, earned an estimated $40
million a year from endorsement contracts. 3 1 Tiger Woods, who finished first
among all athletes based on their 2002 earnings and marketability, 32 will earn
$100 million over five years from his endorsement contract with Nike, alone. 33
In addition, marketers are now aiming their attention at non-traditional athletes
such as charismatic X-gamers 34 and female competitors. 35 For example,
"snowboarder Terje Haakonsen reportedly earn[s more than] $600,000.00 per
36
year for endors[ing]... snowboards, footwear, and eyewear. ...
Additionally, tennis star Venus Williams signed a $40 million endorsement
37
contract with Reebok.
As examples like these become more common, a trend grows increasingly
more evident; the market power of the sports industry in combination with
rapidly expanding media coverage of athletic events, has created a target
38
audience in the broad public for the purposes of marketing products
associated with an athlete's on-the-field success and charisma. In turn, the
members of this audience have become mass consumers of these products,
resulting in a unique opportunity for athletes to attain both fame and financial
39
security during their short-lived playing careers.
C. Athletes' Needfor Protection

Because an athlete's career longevity is often cut short due to injury or a

30. Weber, supra note 21, at 326.
31. Ralph Frammolino, Serena Completes Glam Slam, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2003, at Al; see
Weber, supra note 21, at 326.
32. Bob Young, He's Money in the Bank; Stoudemire Future Big Off Court, THE ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, Jan. 14, 2003, at IC (citing Forbes top ten athletes based on their earnings and
marketability).
33. Frammolino, supra note 31.
34. See e.g., Weber, supra note 21, at 326-27; Frammolino, supra note 31.
35. See Frammolino, supra note 31.
36. Weber, supra note 21, at 326.
37. Frammolino, supra note 31.
38. Griffith, supra note 4, at 720.
39. See generally Weber, supra note 21, at 326; Melissa Gillespie, After the Lights Go Out Looking
Beyond
the
Game,
Sports
Media
Group,
(Aug.
10,
2003),
at
http://www.buzzle.com/editorials/8-10-2003-44070.asp?viewPage=3;
Int'l Ass'n of Drilling
Contractors Health, Safety & Env't Committee, Minutes of Meeting, (Oct. 7, 1999) at
http://www.iadc.org/committees/hse/minutes/1999/MIN 100799.htm (last visited March 15, 2004).
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decline in talent, 40 it is crucial that each athlete maximize his 4 1 earning
potential while he is still playing; thus, enabling himself to remain financially
secure even after he has retired. 42 Since there is much at stake, it is in the
athlete's best interest to capitalize on consumers' wide demand for goods
associated with the most entertaining and talented athletes by marketing
himself and his abilities while on the field. Thus, many athletes have sought to
celebratory moves or
take advantage of this special opportunity by performing
43
dances following their execution of a superior play.
As worldwide access to sporting events continues to expand, thereby
creating an ever-growing market for goods associated with the most
entertaining and athletic players, 44 protection of45athletes' creative, sports
celebration moves becomes increasingly necessary.
Protection of athletes' sports celebration moves is necessary because a
sports celebration move can be a key component of an athlete's market power
and of his earnings derived from that market power. 46 This is perhaps most

40. Mich. Intercollegiate Athletic Ass'n, Special Concerns Unique to Performers, at
http://www.miaawellness.net/unique.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2004).
41. The use of "his" in this comment is employed merely because it is the author's writing style.
The reference to the male form of the pronoun is not to imply that only male athletes' sports
celebration moves are eligible for copyright protection.
42. Frank R. Veltri, Ed.D. & Steve A. Long, A New Image: Female Athlete-Endorser, CyberJournal of Sport Marketing, at http://www.nswis.nsw.gov.au/fulltext/1998/cjsm/v2n4/veltrilong24.
htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2003). ("[Althletes have a short career compared to other professions.
Consequently [they] will use every possible means to increase their earnings during and after their
careers, including negotiation of endorsement contracts to supplement earnings."); Gillespie, supra
note 39.
43. See generally Seth Stevenson, Signs and Wonders: A Brief History of Celebratory Sports
Gestures, MICROSOFT NETWORK, (Nov. 27, 1997), at http://slate.msn.com/?id=3461. See also Sean
Jensen, Let's Dance:End Zone Celebrations Go Way Back, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL ONLINE, (Dec.
9, 1998), at http://www.jsonline.com/packer/sbxxxiii/news/dancel20998.asp.
44. Weber, supra note 21, at 325-26; see also Massive Revenue Growth Forecastedfor Internet
Sports Sites, supra note 24.
45. Weber,supra note 21, at 325-26.
46. See Allyson Turner, Then & Now: Ickey Woods, CBS SPORTSLINE, at http://www.cbs.
sportsline.com/u/thennow/woods.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2003). (Turner writes, "[t]he Ickey Shuffle
took on a life of its own with fans everywhere imitating his end zone dance. There were Ickey shirts,
songs, commercials and a milk shake.").Veltri & Long, supra note 42. (Quoting Schaaf "The
marketability of an athlete depends on tangible factors, such as level of skill and success in the sport.
Marketability also depends on many intangible factors... [sjuch [as] image, charisma, physical
); Calvey, a Business Times Staff writer, notes that athletes have
appearance, and personality ....
several sources of income, including income from endorsements and advertisements. Calvey states,
"The big bucks [are] earned during [an athlete's] short career on the field plus related income from
endorsements, advertising and other deals." Mark Calvey, Sports stars need help playing the numbers
game, at http://sanfrancisco.bizjoumals.com/sanfrancisco/stories/1998/09/07/focus2.html (last visited
October 31, 2003).
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true for athletes who, unlike Michael Jordan or Tiger Woods, are not

consistently the best performers in their respective leagues. Athletes who are
not consistently the best performers on the playing field must rely more on the
attention they gain from their charisma, personality, and physical appearance
47
than on the attention they gain from their superior talent.

Because sports celebration moves serve as a reflection of an athlete's
personality and charisma, these moves become even more valuable to lesser-

talented athletes who can use their move as an attention-grabbing medium
through which they can exhibit their charisma and personality while on the

playing field. Thus, because each move serves as an identifier of a particular
player's charisma, personality, and excitement for the game, and can thereby

add significantly to an athlete's market power, it is crucial that each athlete has
a way to prohibit other competitors from exploiting, claiming rights to, or
diluting the novelty of his sports celebration move.

Copyright law, almost certainly, offers the most effective protection for an
47. While an athlete's success on the playing field may be a leading factor of the athlete's
marketability, other, more intangible factors such as personality, charisma, and appearance are just as
important. Veltri & Long, supra note 42. Weber, supra note 21, at 327. (Quoting Weber "[I]t stands
to reason that in... sports ... endorsement contracts are available not only to athletes who
consistently win competitions, but also to those who develop a unique and instantly-recognizable
style that fires audiences' imaginations"). Therefore, while an athlete may be highly marketable
primarily because of her superior talent, another athlete may be just as marketable chiefly because of
her charisma and personality. This theory is exemplified by athletes like Anna Koumikova, who
ranked No. 71 on the WTA tour but still placed second in the list of the most marketable female
athletes. News Munchies: Mia Hamm Beats the Daylights Out of Mike Tyson, (Jan. 28, 2002),
http://www.cornerbarpr.com/articles/munchies.cfm?article=19. Koumikova is more sought after for
endorsement contracts than either Venus or Serena Williams who are both top players on the WTA
tour. Id. While Kournikova may not have superior skills relative to the other players on the WTA
tour, her personality and appearance are able to compensate for her lack of on-the-court success and
allow her to nevertheless be highly marketable. This was also the case for Ickey Woods. Though
Ickey Woods had a brief professional career in the National Football League, his charisma, revealed
by the Ickey Shuffle, made him highly marketable even into his retirement. See e.g., Turner, supra
note 46; Geoff Hobson, Ickey In Step With 'Dirty Bird': Falcons Dance Like the Shuffle, (Jan. 20,
1999), The Cincinnati Enquirer at http://bengals.enquirer.com/1999/01/20/ben ickey instepwith.
html. Ten years after Ickey created the shuffle, he was still asked to perform the move publicly at
events like the groundbreaking of Paul Brown Stadium. Id. Likewise, simply because an athlete has
superior skills, it does not indicate that he will be the most highly sought after player. This is why a
player with an "edge," like Allen Iverson will "sell[] in a way that Tim Duncan [one of the league's
most talented but bland players] could never dream." Tim Keown, Iverson Is Money In the Bank,
ESPN The Magazine, available at http://www.espn.go.com/magazine/keown_20010601.html (last
visited Nov. 2, 2003).
Veltri & Long, supra note 42. (Quoting Fink "[M]any endorsement contracts were awarded to
athletes based on the athlete's popularity, talent, and charisma. Celebrities with high profiles were
believed to be more persuasive and influential on consumer behavior .... '[C]orporations are looking
for that one player who goes above and beyond, and the team's success is at least partly responsible
because of them ...
'). (Quoting Gotthelf "[C]ompanies often measure value in terms of 'highlight
time,' the frequency with which a player appears on ESPN's 'SportsCenter' program.").

MARQUETTE SPORTS LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 14:2

athlete's celebratory move. While the idea of protecting an athlete's sports
celebration move with copyright may seem overripe, competitors from past
decades had little need for it. 48 They had "few profitable avenues to exploit
[a] copyright [protected move] .... [Further, e]xhibitions of athletic events
were far more limited than today and - - athletes' performances were...
available for the most part only to attending fans and on [a few] television
49
broadcasts."
Today, however, the increased commercialization of sports 50 as well as the
growing focus on the "individual athlete's" performance and persona5 ' has
made copyright protection for athletes' individual efforts, which contribute to
52
the excitement and originality of each performance, imperative.
II. THE COPYRIGHT LAW POWERS

Part II of this comment will explore the copyright powers given to
Congress and copyright's purpose. In addition, this section will detail the
analysis used to determine the copyrightability of a work.
A. The Constitution's Copyright Clause
Article I, § 8, cl. 8 of the United States Constitution, also known as the
"Copyright Clause," expressly grants the copyright powers to Congress. 53 The
48. Weber, supra note 21, at 320-21.
49. Id.at 320.
50. Trevor Slack, Studying the Commercialization of Sport: The Need for Critical Analysis,
Sociology of Sport Online, at http://physed.otago.ac.nz/sosoUvlil/vlila6.htm (last visited Oct. 31,
2003). ("[fIn no previous time period have we seen the type of growth in the commercialization of
sport, that we have seen in the last two decades. Today, sport is big business and big businesses are
heavily involved in sport. Athletes in the major spectator sports are marketable commodities, sports
teams are traded on the stock market, sponsorship rights at major events can cost millions of
dollars...").
51. "Companies are more interested in equating their images with individuals than they are with
team winners." DALE HOFFMAN & MARTIN J. GREENBERG, SPORT$BIZ 89 (Leisure Press, 1989)
(quoting Robert Dowling, the editor of Sports Marketing News.); The Marketing Edge, EDGE SPORTS
INTERNATIONAL, INC., at http://www.edgesportsintil.com/cedge.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2003). ("In
the age of multi-million dollar contracts, billion dollar television network deals and trend-setting
advertising campaigns the athlete has become the center of it all. It is the athlete who can make an
inner city youth spend his money on $150.00 shoes or motivate an impressionable 12-year-old to stay
in school.... The most marketable athletes are those who understand the importance of maintaining
a positive public image in order to capitalize on their athletic achievements."). See generally Darren
Rovell, 'King' James Proves A Ratings Bonanza for ESPN2, (Dec. 13, 2002), at
http://www.espn.go.com/sportsbusiness/s/2002/1213/1476503.html.
52. Weber, supra note 21, at 326.
53. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 1.02 (2002).
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Clause states:
The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o promote the Progress of

Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
54
Discoveries.
While extracting the Framers' intent from the Clause may seem difficult,
the courts have nevertheless succeeded in construing a reasonable
interpretation of copyright's purpose from the Clause.
i. Copyright's Purpose
The true purpose of copyright, as the Framers intended it, is not clear from
the language in the Clause. 55 Further, there is relatively little legislative history
available to expound upon the Framers' intent. 56 At best, "[i]ts effect.., is to
' 57
suggest certain minimal elements to be contained in copyright legislation."
The courts have contributed little to resolve this ambiguity.5 8 Because
they have "rarely felt called upon to construe the Copyright Clause [,]...
there is no vast body of case law imparting a judicial gloss ...comparable to
that found in connection with other provisions of the Constitution." 59 There
are, however, enough decisions, which allow legislators, as well as the courts,
60
to construe a reasonable and consistent interpretation of copyright's purpose.
The majority of these decisions hold that the essence of copyright law is to
encourage authors' individual efforts that advance the public welfare, with the
incentive to profit. 6 1 Though Justice Stevens, in Eldred v. Ashcroft,
characterized the idea of rewarding authors for their works as "a secondary
consideration" of copyright law,6 2 the majority would challenge Justice
Stevens's position. 63 Later in that opinion, the Court notes:
"[T]he economic philosophy behind the [Copyright] [C]lause... is

54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8.
55. NIMMER, supra note 53, at § 1.02.

56. Id.
57. Id.at § 1.03.
58. Id.at § 1.02.

59. Id.
60. See generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212-13 (2003); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,
219 (1954); Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991).
61. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212-13; Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219.
62. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 227 (quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131,
158, n. 4 (1948)).
63. See generally id.at 212, n.18.
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the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal
gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of
authors and inventors." 64 ...

Accordingly, "copyright law celebrates

the profit motive, recognizing that the incentive to profit from the
exploitation of copyrights will redound to the public benefit by
resulting in the proliferation of knowledge.... The profit motive is
65
the engine that ensures the progress of science."
Eldred makes it clear that the purpose of copyright is to use a profit
motive to encourage authors to create works that will advance the public
66
welfare.
ii. The Application of Copyright's Purpose
Though case law has helped to more clearly define the purpose of
copyright, the Copyright Clause does not require that each "writing" protected
67
by copyright actually promote this purpose.
Rather, the current majority view, set forth in Mitchell Bros. Film Group
v. Cinema Adult Theater, found that the Clause merely requires that Congress
shall promote copyright's purpose through its creation of copyright
legislation. 68 Therefore, while "Congress could require that each copyrighted
work be shown to protect the useful arts (as it has with patents),... [it could

just as] reasonably conclude that the best way to promote creativity is not to
impose any governmental restrictions on the subject matter of copyrightable
69
works."
B. The CopyrightAct of 1976
The Copyright Clause powers, expressly vested in Congress, allow
Congress to enact copyright legislation. 70 The Copyright Act of 1976,
housing Congress's copyright legislation, is the most current edition of the
72
Act. 7 1 "[I]t provides the basic structure for U.S. copyright law today.

64. Id.(quoting Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219).
65. Id. (quoting Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1992),
aff'd, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994)).
66. Id.
67. NIMMER, supra note 53, at § 1.03[B].
68. Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 860 (5th Cir. 1979) cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980); see also NIMMER, supra note 53, at § 1.03[B].
69. Mitchell Bros., 604 F.2d at 860.
70. See NIMMER, supra note 53, at § 1.02.
71. See Weber, supra note 21, at 320. See generally Griffith, supra note 4, at 685.
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Generally, the 1976 Act, in contrast to the preceding Act of 1909, broadens the
scope of copyright protection; "broaden[s] the rights granted to copyright
73
owners, and lengthen[s] the term of protection for all copyrighted works."
Additionally, the 1976 Act discards the 1909 Act's requirement of
74
publication in order for authors to receive federal copyright protection.
Now, the Act immediately "grants a limited statutory monopoly in original
works of authorship [the moment they are] fixed in a tangible medium of
75
expression."
Moreover, the current version of the Act offers copyright owners five
exclusive rights, including "the traditional rights of reproduction and
distribution [as well as the] broadened rights of public performance[, public]
display[,] and a newly defined right to create derivative works based on the
76
copyrighted work."
i. Copyrightable Subject Matter
Section 102 of the Act states:
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in [(1)]
original works of authorship [(2)] fixed in any tangible medium of
expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be
perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated, either directly or
77
with the aid of a machine or device.
(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
78
work.
Section 102(a) sets forth two requirements that a work must satisfy before
becoming eligible for copyright protection. 79 First, the work must be an
"original work of authorship." 80 Second, the "original work of authorship"

72. COHEN ETAL., supra note 1, at 34.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 35.
Id.
Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
§ 106; COHEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 35.

77. § 102(a).
78. § 102(b).
79. § 102(a).
80. Id.
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must be fixed in a "tangible medium of expression." 81 Further, § 102(b)
makes it clear that not every work, even if it satisfies the two requirements set
forth in § 102(a), will be eligible for copyright protection. 82 Instead, the Act's
final requirement, detailed in § 102(b), directs that in addition to § 102(a)
83
requirements, the work must fall within the subject matter of copyright.
(a) Originality
"The sine qua non of copyright is originality

84

In Feist Publicationsv. Rural Telephone Service Co., the Supreme Court
set forth the required elements of an "original" work. 85 The Court stated,
"[o]riginal, as the term is used in copyright, means only that[: (1)] the work
[is] independently created by the author[;]... and [(2)] that it possesses at least
'86
some minimal degree of creativity."
i. Independent Creation
An "original" work must be independently created, not merely copied
from another's work. 87 However, an "original" work is not required to be
novel. 88 Even if a work is identical to another's work, provided that it is a
product of its author's independent efforts, it will nevertheless satisfy this
prerequisite. 89 In the words of Judge Learned Hand, '"[i]f by some magic a
man who had never known [Keats' Ode on a Grecian Urn] were to compose
anew Keats' Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would [nevertheless] be an
"author .. ."'90
ii. Creativity
Assuming that the work satisfies the first prong of the "originality"
81. Id.
82. § 102(b).
83. Id.
84. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (emphasis added).
85. Id.
86. Id. (citing 1 M. NIMMER& D. NIMMER, Copyright §§ 2.01[A], [B] (1990)).
87. "Originality in this context 'means little more than a prohibition of actual copying."' Alfred
Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951) (quoting Hoague-Sprague
Corp. v. Frank C. Meyer, Inc., 31 F.2d 583, 586 (D.C.N.Y. 1929)).
88. See Lee v. Runge, 404 U.S. 887, 891-92 (1971); see also COHEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 76.
89. NIMMER, supra note 53, at § 2.01[A].
90. Id.
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requirement, it must still exhibit "some minimal degree of creativity." 9 1 In
Alfred Bell & Co. v. CataldaFine Arts, Inc., the Second Circuit states that,
All that is needed to satisfy both the Constitution and the statute is that
the "author" contribute[s] something more than a "merely trivial"
variation, something recognizably "his own."
Originality in this
context "means little more than a prohibition of actual copying." No
matter how poor artistically the 'author's' addition, it is enough if it be
92
his own.
With this statement, the court in Alfred Bell makes it clear that "the
modem definition of 'originality' requires more than mere independent
93
creation, but not much more."
If it is determined that the work is sufficiently "original," the work must
then satisfy the requirement of fixation.
(b) Fixation
According to section 101 of the Copyright Act:
A work is "fixed" in a tangible medium of expression when its
embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the
author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than
94
transitory duration.
Because the Copyright Act of 1976 offers protection to both published and
unpublished works-unlike the 1909 Act, which required works to be
published before receiving copyright protection- the moment the work meets
the "fixation" standard the work itself is considered to exist for purposes of
federal copyright law. 95 For example, for purposes of federal copyright
protection, a musical composition exists from the instant that the author causes
the musical notation to be written on paper. 96 Congress revised the 1909 Act's
97
definition of "fixed" in anticipation of new technological developments:
[The] broad language is intended to avoid the artificial and largely
unjustifiable distinctions, derived from such cases as White-Smith...

91. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345; see also Weber, supra note 21, at 348.
92. Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 102-03 (citing Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250).
93. COHEN ETAL., supra note 1, at 76. See generallyAlfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 102-03.
94. § 101.
95. COHEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 66.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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under which statutory copyrightability... has been made to depend
upon the form or medium in which the work is fixed. Under the bill it
makes no difference what the form, manner, or medium of fixation
whether
may be-whether it is in words, numbers,. . .pictures, ....
embodied in a physical object in written, printed,... magnetic, or any
other stable form, and whether it is capable of perception directly or
by means of any machine or device "now known or later
98
developed."
Furthermore, in accord with the Copyright Act, a work is not "fixed" if its
embodiment in tangible form is not "sufficiently permanent or stable to permit
it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of
Though the required quantum of
more than transitory duration." 99
permanency or stability seems unclear from this statement, case law suggests
that it is a reasonably low standard to meet. 100
In Williams Electronics,Inc. v. Artic International,Inc., the Third Circuit
found that a video game's display stored in Random Only Memory (ROM)
constituted a "fixed" work for the purposes of copyright.il 1 The court stated,
"[t]he (video game's) display satisfies the statutory definition of an original
'audiovisual work,' and the memory devices [ROM] of the game satisfy the
10 2
statutory requirement of a 'copy' in which the work is fixed."'
This finding was taken one step farther in MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak
Computer, Inc.103 In that case, the Ninth Circuit found that Random Access
Memory (RAM) - in RAM, the stored information is lost when the computer is
turned off, unlike the permanently stored information in ROM, 104 qualifies as
a sufficient medium for the purposes of fixation. 10 5 The court in that case
because it can be "'perceived,
commented, "the copy made in RAM is 'fixed'
' 10 6
reproduced, or otherwise communicated."

98. Id; H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1976), available at
http://www.titleI7.com/contentLegMat/houseReport/chpt0I/sec I02.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2003).
99. Id.
100. See generally Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artie Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982); MAI
Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 510 U.S. 1033
(1994).
101. Williams Elecs., 685 F.2d at 876-77.
102. Id.at 874.
103. See generally MA! Systems, 991 F.2d 511.
104. Id. at519.
105. Id.
106. Id. (quoting § 101).
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(c) Works ofAuthorship
If the work is both sufficiently "original" and "fixed," for purposes of
copyright protection, the work must then survive the third and last hurdle;
07
namely, it must fall within the subject matter of copyright. 1
The Copyright Act delineates the types of works, in eight broad
10 8
categories, which are eligible for copyright protection in section 102(a):
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and
109
(8) architectural works.

While these categories detail the types of works that expressly fall within
the scope of copyrightable subject matter, "'these categories are [meant to be]
illustrative[,] not limitative, and.., do not necessarily exhaust the scope of
'original works of authorship' that the bill is intended to protect." '1 10
Congress intended to leave the phrase "works of authorship" undefined."'
Congress did not further define the phrase because it intended a "flexible
definition.., that would neither 'freeze the scope of copyrightable subject
matter at the present stage of communications technology nor ... allow
unlimited expansion into areas completely outside the present congressional
intent.'112
Though section 102 (a) does not include every type of work that is
considered copyrightable subject matter, "13 section 102 (b) does include those
works that are "categorically excluded from receiving copyright

107. See § 102.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. NIMMER, supra note 53, at § 2.03[A]; see e.g., Weber, supra note 21, at 350; Griffith, supra
note 4, at 714.
111. NIMMER, supra note 53, at § 2.03[A]; Weber, supra note 21, at 350.
112. Weber, supra note 21, at 350.
113. See § 102(a); NIMMER, supra note 53, at § 2.03[A].
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protection." 114 Works that fall under section 102 (b) are precluded from
copyright protection because they are regarded as ideas under the
idea/expression dichotomy.
i. The Idea/Expression Dichotomy
The idea/expression dichotomy is perhaps, "the most fundamental axiom
of copyright law." 1 5 The language giving rise to this copyright conundrum is
found in section 102 (b) where it states, "[i]n no case does copyright
protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea,

. . .

regardless

of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
1
work." 16
The purpose behind "copyright's idea/expression dichotomy [is to strike]
'a definitional balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act
by permitting free communication of facts [and ideas] while still protecting an
author's expression.""'1 7 Ideas and facts are the "basic building blocks of
copyrightable expression." 1 8 Copyright encourages authors to combine these
basic forms, like words or musical notes, in a sufficiently creative way to
construct an "original work of authorship." Therefore, to grant a monopoly in
the building blocks of copyrightable expression would be to stifle future
1 19
creativity and, hence, be counterproductive.
While one cannot receive copyright protection of an idea or a fact, an
original and creative expression of that idea or fact is certainly eligible for
copyright protection. 120 However, attempting to separate the idea from an
expression of that idea is much more difficult than it seems. "The distinction
between nonprotectible 'ideas' and their protectible 'expression' is one of the
most pervasive, as well as one of the most elusive, threads in copyright
law."121
Baker v. Selden reveals the complexity of this dichotomy. 122 In that case,

114. § 102(b) (emphasis added). See generally COHEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 90.
115. Feist, 499 U.S. at 344-45.
116. § 102(b).
117. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985) (quoting
Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 723 F.2d 195, 203 (1983)).
118. COHEN ET AL., supra note l, at 90.
119.
120.
121.
LAW 30

Seeid.
Id. See generally Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); Feist,499 U.S. 340.
Griffith, supra note 4, at 694 (quoting WILLIAM F..PATRY, LATMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT
( 6 th ed. 1986)).
122. See generally Baker, 101 U.S. 99.
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Selden authored a book explaining a unique system of bookkeeping.123 Baker
124
authored subsequent books, which discussed an almost identical system.
125
However, Baker expressed the system in a new, creative, and original way.
The Court found that Baker did not infringe on Selden's copyright 126 because,
[Baker] use[d] a similar plan so far as the results are concerned; but
[he] ma[de] a different arrangement of the columns, and use[d]
different headings. ... Where the truths of a science or the methods
of an art are the common property of the whole world, any author has
the right to express the one, or explain and use the other, in his own
27
way. 1
Although Baker used Selden's ideas, he expressed those ideas in a new
and creative way. Here, Baker used Selden's ideas as building blocks to create
a new, copyrightable expression. This case serves as a prime example of how
the idea/expression dichotomy furthers copyright's goal, "to promote the
128
progress of science and useful arts."'
ii. Useful Articles: Functional v. Non-Functional
Separating protectible form from unprotectible function presents a similar
and an equally perplexing task for the courts. 129 The solely "utilitarian aspects
of 'useful articles'130 are not subject to copyright protection."' 13 1 Additionally,
"if an article has any intrinsic utilitarian function, it can be denied copyright
protection except to the extent that its artistic features can be identified
132
separately and are capable of existing independently as a work of art."
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of separating protectible form
from unprotectible function in Mazer v. Stein. 133 In that case, the Court found
that, "[a] subsequent utilization of a work of art in an article of manufacture in

123. Id. at 99-100.
124. Id. at 100.
125. Id.
126. Baker, 101 U.S. at 107.
127.
128.
( 2 ' Cir.
129.

Id. at 100-01.
NIMMER, supra note 53, at § 1.03 [B] (quoting Chambalin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512
1945)).
COHEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 219.

130. "A 'useful article' is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to
portray the appearance of the article or to convey information." § 101.
131. Griffith, supra note 4, at 696; see Fabrica Inc. v. El Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890, 893-94
(9th Cir. 1983)
132. Fabrica, 697 F.2d at 893 (emphasis added); see § 101.
133. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
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no way affects the right of the copyright owner to be protected against
134
infringement of the work of art itself."
However, even after Mazer, the line between form and function is still
quite blurry. This complicates the courts' task of determining, on a case-bycase basis, whether the creative, artistic features of a work can be separated
35
from, and exist independently of a work's utilitarian features.1
In an effort to simplify the issue, Congress released a House Report in
1976. In the report, Congress "added language to the definition of 'pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works' [to clarify] the distinction between works of
applied art[, which are] protectible under the bill[,] and industrial designs [,
which are] not subject to copyright protection."' 136 The House Report attempts
to further define this vague line, stating:
The test of separability and independence from "the utilitarian aspects
of the article" does not depend upon the nature of the design - that is,
even if the appearance of an article is determined by esthetic (as
opposed to functional) considerations, only elements, if any, which
can be identified separately from the useful article as such are
copyrightable. 137
Despite this additional language, courts continue to experience difficulty
in resolving this issue.
After carefully reviewing the copyright analysis detailed in this section,
the question still remains: how does this analysis apply to sports celebration
moves, if at all? The next section of this paper, Part III, seeks to answer this
question.
III. THE COPYRIGHTABILITY OF SPORTS CELEBRATION MOVES
Part III of this paper will apply the copyright analysis detailed in Part II, to
sports celebration moves to determine whether these moves are copyrightable.

134. Id.at 204.
135. See generally Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980)
(discussing the separability of form from function of a belt buckle); Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ.
Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985) (contemplating the functionality of a four poly-styrene
human torso forms); Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987)
(contrasting the utilitarian and artistic features of a bike rack); Fabrica, 697 F.2d 890. See also
COHEN ET AL., supra note 1,at 219.
136. COHEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 219. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, supra note 97, at

54-55.
137. H.R. REP No. 94-1476, supra note 97; see also COHEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 220.

2004]

THE COPYRIGHTABILITY OF SPORTS CELEBRATION...

589

A. Introduction
As discussed in Part I of this comment, many factors including the rapid
expansion in media coverage of athletic events, the growing focus by fans and
the media on an "individual athlete's" on-the-field success and charisma, and
the fans' willingness to spend large amounts of money on products associated
with their favorite teams and athletes, have resulted in a unique opportunity for
athletes to attain both fame and financial security during their generally short138
lived playing careers.
Athletes have the opportunity to capitalize on this phenomenon by
drawing the attention of both the media and the fans to themselves, through
performing sport celebration moves after they complete a successful play.
While performing these moves, athletes are able to market themselves and
build their brand on the playing field.
Perhaps the best known examples of these sports celebration moves
include the "Ickey Shuffle," 139 the "Dirty Bird,"'140 and the dances of Billy
"White Shoes" Johnson." 14 1 However, not all sports celebration moves are
14 2
performed by athletes who participate in one of the "Big Four" sports.
Athletes like professional bowler, Pete Weber, have also benefited from the
attention drawn to themselves and their superior athletic abilities through
sports celebration moves. 143 Pete Weber has brought unprecedented attention
to both his skills and the Pro Bowling Association events with his wild, sports
44
celebration moves. 1
It is this same explosion of media attention and economic opportunity
driving these athletes' creative celebrations that is also necessitating the
protection of their sports celebration moves. Because an athlete's sports

138. See Mich. Intercollegiate Athletic Ass'n, supra note 40; Int'l Ass'n of Drilling Contractors
Health, Safety & Env't Committee, supra note 39.
139. See Sean Jensen, Where To Draw the Line In the NFL, SOUTHCOAST
2001, at C12, available at http://www.s-t.com/daily/12-01/12-10-01/cl2sp113.htm
29, 2003); see also Turner, supra note 46.
140. See Jensen, supra note 139; Curt Sylvester, Dirty Bird Flying High In
FREE PRESS, Dec. 18, 1998, at http://www.freep.com/sports/football/qnflcoll8.htm
29, 2003).

TODAY, Dec. 10,
(last visited Mar.
Atlanta, DETROIT
(last visited Mar.

141. See Jensen, supra note 139; see also Jensen, supra note 43.
142. The "Big Four" sports refers to baseball, basketball, football, and hockey. These are
generally accepted as the four most popular sports in American culture. See generally Weber, supra
note 21, at 320.
143. Tom Clark, Brash, Raunchy Weber Is Just What Bowling Needs, USA TODAY, Feb. 12,
2002, available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/bowling/clark/2002-02-12-clark.htm (last visited
Mar. 29, 2003).
144. Id.
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celebration move can become such a valuable component of his marketing
package, athletes need a means through which they can protect their sports
celebration moves to prevent others from exploiting, claiming rights to, or
diluting the novelty of their particular moves. Copyright would be the most
appropriate and effective means of protecting these works. However, because
this is essentially a matter of first impression, the question remains whether
sports celebration moves are copyrightable.
B. Application of the Principlesof Copyright to Sports CelebrationMoves
This section will apply the principles of copyright to determine whether
sports celebration moves are copyrightable.
i. The Purpose of Copyright
The purpose of copyright, as discussed in Part II, is to encourage authors'
145
individual efforts with a profit incentive.
As noted above, athletes have a momentous opportunity to profit by
creating celebratory moves and dances, which ultimately draw fan and media
attention to their individual successes on the playing field. 146 It follows that, as
the attention to their respective success on the playing field increases, an
athletes' opportunity to earn money from more lucrative endorsement
147
contracts and additional financial incentives also escalates.
An example of this phenomenon occurred following Jamal Anderson's
creation and performance of the "Dirty Bird." 14 8 Sales of products associated
with Anderson's name skyrocketed. 14 9 One store owner commented, "'[w]e
can't keep jerseys in ....

We've sold out of the Jamal Anderson jerseys. At

one time, we had almost 30. Then we had another shipment of 24. All of
150
them are sold out.'
145. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212, n.18; Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219.
146. See Turner, supra note 46. (Turner writes, "[t]he Ickey Shuffle took on a life of its own with
fans everywhere imitating his end zone dance. There were Ickey shirts, songs, commercials and a
milk shake.").
147. See Weber, supra note 21, at 326.
148. See Forget the Funky Chicken, the Dirty Bird is the Word, CNN SPORTS ILL., (Jan. 29,
1999), at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/footbal/nfl/1998/playoffs/news/i999/playoffs/news/1999/
01/28/dirtybird/.
149. See Jim Thomas, Retailers Do the 'Dirty Bird' Over Falcons Merchandise, SAVANNAH
MORNING NEws, (Jan. 17, 1999), at http://www.savannahnow.com/stories/0l1799/SPTfalconsmer.
html.
150. Id.; While it is impossible to claim that the increase in merchandise sales was due solely to
Anderson's sports celebration move, there can be little doubt that the move served a pivotal role in
drawing fans' attention to his on-the-field success. Not only is success on the playing field a key
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While the incentive to profit is certainly a motivating factor for athletes to
put forth the individual effort in creating these moves, it is not the lone reason
why athletes create celebratory dances. 15 1 Athletes, like Jamal Anderson,

create the moves to ignite the fans' enthusiasm, and contribute creatively to
the game they love. 152 In other words, they seek to advance the public
welfare. 153 Anderson explained the reasoning behind his dance saying, "[w]e
[had] to do something to kind of give the people a symbol of the Dirty Birds. I
154
just made up the dance."'

Affording athletes copyright protection encourages them to put forth their
efforts in creating original, celebratory dances, with the incentive to profit. In
turn, these victory dances will advance the public welfare by furthering the
fans' enthusiasm and the thrill of sport. Therefore, the rationale for protecting
these moves is fully consistent with the purpose of copyright.

ii. Copyrightable Subject Matter
Athletes' performances, perhaps because they are so skilled and graceful,
have long been analogized with the execution of complex choreographies
performed by the most renowned dancers and artisans. 15 5 In particular,

athletes' sports celebration moves are often referred to as choreographies or
56

dances. 1

Additionally, unlike ordinary sports moves that are regularly performed in
accord with a standard form or method and can often be considered a
functional and necessary feature of a particular game,' 57 sports celebration
element of one's marketability, but an athlete's personality, charisma, and physical appearance can
also contribute significantly to her marketability. See supra text accompanying note 47.
15 1. See Sylvester, supra note 140.
152. Jensen, supra note 43. (Quoting Johnson "You get the fans all dressed up and into the game,
and someone scores a big touchdown; that little gesture becomes your 121h man, it gets things
going.").
153. Sports celebration moves seek to advance the public welfare by providing the public with
more exciting entertainment and by contributing to the continuance of the cultural influence of sport.
See generally Jensen, supra note 43. (Quoting Johnson "There [are] a lot of pluses to keeping fans
happy. When you think about it, we're all entertainers.").
154. Sylvester, supra note 140.
155. In reaction to a graceful catch made by Rocky Blier in Superbowl XIII, Pittsburgh Steelers
announcer, Myron Cope, exclaimed, "what a heck of a catch that was by Rocky Blier, huh? Would
you have expected Rocky Blier to turn into Nijinksy?" BATTLE OF CHAMPIONS SUPERBOWL XIIIHIGHLIGHTS (NFL Films Mar. 6, 1984).
156. See e.g., Sean Keeler, Ickey Wishes O'Donnell Would Shuffle Away, THE CINCINNATI POST,
(Sept. 2, 1998), at http://www.cincypost.com/sports/1998/keeler090298.html; Jensen, supra note 138;
Jensen, supra note 43.
157. See Weber, supra note 21, at 359-60.
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moves are often creatively and uniquely choreographed 158 and serve only as a
tangential element of any game. 159 With this reasoning in mind, athlete
celebrations will be thought of as choreographic works for purposes of the
following analysis.
As explained in Part II, the Copyright Act sets forth three requirements
that must be satisfied before a work can become eligible for copyright
protection. Works must: (1) be original; (2) be fixed in a tangible form; and
160
(3) fall within the subject matter of copyright, in order to be copyrightable.
An analysis of the copyrightability of sports celebration moves or dances, with
respect to these requirements, follows.
(a) Originality
To satisfy the requirement of "originality," a work must be: "[(1)]
independently created by the author[;] ... and ... [(2)] possess[ ] at least some
16 1
minimal degree of creativity."'
i. Independent Creation
"The copyrighted work need not be novel, merely independently
originated in the author."' 162 This prerequisite does not create a high barrier to
the copyrightability of sports celebration moves.
Most often, an athlete choreographs a celebratory move as a matter of selfexpression. 163 His aim is not only to create a novel work, but also to
choreograph a work that directly expresses his feelings when he scores a
touchdown or slugs a towering blast over the outfield fence.' 64 Therefore,
these works are almost always inherently "independently originated in the
16 5
author."
ii. Creativity
To satisfy the creativity requirement, the Second Circuit noted, "[a]ll that
is needed to satisfy both the Constitution and the statute is that the author
158. Turner, supra note 46.
159. Weber, supra note 21, at 358.
160. § 102.
161. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (citing 1 NIMMER, Copyright §§ 2.01[A], [B] (1990)).
162. Weber, supra note 21, at 348; see e.g., Lee, 404 U.S. at 891-892; see also COHEN ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 76.
163. See Turner, supra note 46; see also Weber, supra note 21, at 358.
164. Weber, supra note 21, at 358.
165. Id. at 348.
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contributed something more than a 'merely trivial' variation, something
16 6
recognizably 'his own."'
In one of the few cases to discuss the copyrightability of ordinary sports
moves, the Seventh Circuit in Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League
Baseball Players Ass 'n, stated that, "[o]nly a modicum of creativity is required
for a work to be copyrightable.... [T]he Players' performances [therefore]
167
possess the modest creativity required for copyrightability."'
In accord with the Seventh Circuit's analysis in Baltimore Orioles, if
ordinary sports moves satisfy copyright's creativity condition, sports
celebration moves are sure to possess the minimal creativity required for an
original work. 168 Often, ordinary sports moves such as a golf putt or a
pitcher's motion are literally going to exhibit a merely trivial variation over a
previous golf putt or another pitcher's motion. However, a choreographed
dance, specifically designed by an athlete to be as creative, and attention
grabbing as possible, is certain to possess the required "modicum of
169
creativity.'
Moreover, policy suggests that the fans, not the courts, be the ultimate
trier of fact in determining whether a move exhibits a sufficient quantum of
creativity.' 7 0 Justice Holmes asserted this principle in Bleistein v. Donaldson
LithographingCo.:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the
law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial
illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.... [I]f
[authors' works] command the interest of any public, they have a
commercial value-it would be bold to say that they have not an
aesthetic and educational value-and the taste of any public is not to
17
be treated with contempt. 1
In applying Justice Holmes's assertion to the current analysis, it appears
that the low standard of "the interest of any public" has been met when one
observes the explosion of public interest in sports and the fans', at least

166. Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 102-03.
167. Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 669, n.7 (7th Cir.
1986) cert. denied,480 U.S. 941 (1987).
168. Id.; Weber, supra note 21, at 348-49.
169. Bait. Orioles, 805 F.2d at 669, n.7.
170. Weber, supra note 21, at 349; see, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S.
239, 251-52 (1903) (holding that a circus poster is a piece of purely commercial art and is therefore
copyrightable); Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 669.
171. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251-52; see also Balt. Orioles, 805 F.2d at 669.
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minimal, acceptance of athletes' sports celebration moves. 172 This seemingly
173
indicates that fans have found in favor of athletes' sports celebration moves.
Whether judged by the courts or by the public, sports celebration moves
should most certainly survive this obstacle.
(b) Fixation
The Copyright Act requires that "original works of authorship" [be] fixed
174
in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed.'
This precondition may provide a slightly higher barrier for choreographic
works "because unlike other works, [they are] created in a spatial
environment." 17 5 Therefore, while other works, such as novels, exist for the
purposes of copyright the moment the words are laid out on paper, 176 authors
of choreographic works must complete an additional step in an effort to "fix"
77
their works.1
There are a number of ways in which an author of a choreographic work
can record his work in order to satisfy this condition.178 Under the 1909 Act,
the Copyright Office accepted recordings of "choreographic works in the form
of a verbal description, dance notation, pictorial or graphic diagrams, or a
combination of these."' 179 Perhaps the most effective of these forms, accepted
under the 1909 Act, is dance notation. 180 "Notation is more scientific,
18 1
recorded in symbols to represent almost every movement.'
The current Act accepts these methods of fixation as well as any other
methods "in any tangible medium of expression, now [known] or later
172. See generally Clark, supra note 142; Sylvester, supra note 140; Thomas, supra note 149;
Jensen, supra note 43.
173. Weber, supra note 21, at 349.
174. § 102.
at
'Fixed' Form, COPYRONG,
175. How Can Choreography Be Recorded In
http://edie.cprost.sfu.ca/-jacsen7/janedancerecord.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2003); see generally
Adaline J. Hilgard, Can Choreography and Copyright Waltz Together In the Wake of Horgan v.
Macmillan, Inc.?, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 757, 765 (1994).
176. COHEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 66.
177. See § 102; How Can ChoreographyBe Recorded In 'Fixed'Form, supra note 175; Hilgard,
supra note 175, at 765-66. This situation is similar to the fixation problem that exists with live radio
and television broadcasts. The sounds of which are ephemeral. Nimmer, supra note 51, at §
2.03[B][2]. To protect live broadcasts, the broadcaster must separately record the sounds and images
simultaneously with the broadcast. Id.
178. Hilgard, supra note 175, at 766; Griffith, supra note 4, at 710-11; How Can Choreography
Be Recorded in 'Fixed'Form, supra note 175.
179. NIMMER, supra note 53, at § 2.07[C].
180. Id.; How Can ChoreographyBe RecordedIn 'Fixed' Form, supra note 175.
181. How Can ChoreographyBe RecordedIn 'Fixed'Form,supra note 175.
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developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device."' 182 The
current Act broadens the scope of this requirement, making it significantly

easier for authors of choreographic works to satisfy the condition.'

83

With the ubiquity of modem technology in the form of digital still
cameras, sophisticated video cameras, cell phones that are able to record
sounds and images, voice recording devices, and computers, it would not be

84
difficult for an athlete to "fix" his choreographed, sports celebration move.1

However, this requisite can be easily satisfied even without using these rapidly

improving technologies.

Dance notation or recording the moves on paper

18 5
would be equally as effective.

(c) Works of Authorship
After the first two conditions set forth in § 102 of the Act are satisfied, the
third requirement-that the sports celebration move fall within the subject
matter of copyright-must be addressed. 186 This requirement provides,

perhaps, the most formidable barrier that a work must survive to receive
copyright protection.
Athletic events are not included as one of the eight categories of subject
matter detailed in section 102 (a) of the current Act. 187 This observation was
made in National Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc. 188 In that case, the
Second Circuit noted that "the list [of copyrightable subject matter] does not
include athletic events, and, although the list is concededly non-exclusive,
such events are neither similar nor analogous to any of the listed

182. NIMMER, supra note 53, at § 2.07[C] (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)); see also § 102(a). The
Chicago Bears Shufflin' Crew have one of the only examples of a copyrighted, sports celebration
move. Though their dance, which was performed in a studio, is only quasi-related to the sports
celebration moves discussed in this comment, it provides an example of how an athlete might use
various forms of technology to "fix" his move. See Superbowl Shuffle, No. Pau-793-097, Dec. 9,
1985, available at http://www.loc.gov/cgi-bin/formprocessor/copyright/locis.pl (last visited Mar. 29,
2003).
183. § 102(a). The Act allows for future methods of fixation that may not yet be developed. Id.;
NIMMER, supra note 53, at § 2.07[C].
184. An athlete could simply have a friend, relative, or business partner record his sports
celebration move using one of the mentioned technologies in order to "fix" her move.
185. Griffith, supra note 4, at 710-11 (noting that while notation is sufficient, it would be even
better to also have the dance simultaneously recorded on video). A written form of a choreographed,
celebratory move might look like the description in Forget the Funky Chicken, the Dirty Bird Is the
Word. See Forget the Funky Chicken, the Dirty Bird Is the Word, supra note 148.
186. § 102.
187. NBA, 105 F.3d at 846; § 102(a); see also Weber, supra note 21, at 350.
188. NBA, 105 F.3d at 846.
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categories."
However, it must be noted that the court in that case was dealing with a
very different issue, that of the copyrightability of an "athletic event." 190
Additionally, in addressing the concern that sports celebration moves are not
expressly listed as copyrightable subject matter, it should be noted that "there
is no [clear] indication that the [current] Act should not, and for that matter
could not, be expanded to incorporate new media of expression and creativity
[like athletes' sports celebration moves]."' 19
When Congress broadened the scope of copyright law in 1976, it
established two general categories in which copyrightable subject matter might
fall. 192 Congress created the first classification for works that were already in
existence but that "had only recently been recognized as 'creative,' and
therefore worthy of protection."' 19 3 The second category was opened to new
works "that had never previously existed but became possible due to scientific
discoveries and technological developments."' 194 Composers, artists, and
choreographers have served as the beneficiaries of the Act's broadened
scope. 195 These authors have benefited because the Act's broad language
1 96
allows Congress to expand copyright protection when it so elects.
One of the principal reasons Congress revamped the Copyright Act was
due to the fact that the 1909 Act was rendered obsolete because its narrow
scope failed to allow for technological and societal advances. 197 Hence,
Congress created broader language in anticipation for those "areas of existing
subject matter that [the 1976 Act did] not [yet] propose to protect, but that
198
future Congresses may want to."'
Thus, though Congress may not have had the foresight to recognize the
great societal and economic impact that sports celebration moves and athletic
events would have, sport's popularity and recognized influence is now
certainly appreciated; and the Act's legislative history indicates that Congress
has the ability to expressly include sports moves as copyrightable subject

189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Griffith, supra note 4, at 693.
192. Id. at 685.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Griffith, supra note 4, at 685; H.R. REP NO. 94-1476, supra note 97, at 53.
197. Griffith, supra note 4, at 689.
198. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, supra note 97, at 51; see also NIMMER, supra note 53, at § 2.03[A].
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19 9

However, even if athletes' sports celebration moves are not expressly
included in the subject matter of copyright, these choreographed moves may
nevertheless be considered eligible for copyright protection as choreographic
works. Choreography is defined in Horgan v. Macmillan as:
the composition and arrangement of dance movements and patterns,
and is usually intended to be accompanied by music. Dance is static
and kinetic successions of bodily movement in certain rhythmic and
spatial relationships. Choreographic works need not tell a story in
200
order to be protected by copyright.
"The Act [,however,] does not define choreography." 20 1 Additionally, the
legislative history indicates only that choreography, as it is used in § 102(a) of
the Act, does not include "social dance steps and simple routines." 20 2 "Thus,
for example, the basic waltz step, the hustle step, and the second position of
classical ballet are not copyrightable." 20 3 These basic steps are regarded as
ideas under the idea/expression dichotomy. Ideas are expressly prohibited
20 4
under section 102(b) of the Act.

i.The Idea/Expression Dichotomy
Section 102(b) of the Act implies that "social dance steps and simple
routines" are not copyrightable.
It states, "[a]n idea can never be
20 5
copyrightable, but its expression may be."
In this case, simple dance steps are considered basic ideas for the purpose
of copyrighting choreographic works, just like individual words are considered
basic ideas for the purpose of copyrighting a literary work. Ideas, or in this
case simple dance steps, are the "basic building blocks of [any] copyrightable
expression." 20 6 Thus, to grant a monopoly in the building blocks of
copyrightable expression would be to curtail future creativity, and hence, be
20 7
counterproductive.
199. Griffith, supra note 4, at 693.
200. Horgan v. Macmillan, Inc., 789 F.2d 157, 161 (2d Cir. 1986) (quoting Compendium of
Copyright Office Practices, Compendium II § 450.01 (1984)).
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id.
Id.; see also NIMMER, supra note 53, at § 2.07[B]
Weber, supra note 21, at 356.
§ 102(b).
COHEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 90; see also § 102(b).

206. COHEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 90. The term "social dance steps" is used here as a term of
art, relating to each movement of a more complex routine or choreography.
207. Id.
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Therefore, 102(b) may limit some very simple athlete celebrations like the
"high-five," the "monster bash," or the "Mile-High Salute," which all consist
of one or two basic movements. 20 8 However, "a restriction against the
incorporation of [several] social dance steps and simple routines" does not
exist. ' 20 9 "Social dance steps, folk dance steps, and individual ballet steps
alike may be utilized as the choreographer's basic material in much the same
way that words are the writer's basic material. '2 10 While each word may be
regarded as an uncopyrightable "idea," an original, creative compilation of
words will be treated as a newly created copyrightable expression of those
ideas. Hence, in this case, while each simple step may be considered an
uncopyrightable idea, more complex sports celebration moves that incorporate
many steps, such as the "Ickey Shuffle" or the "Dirty Bird," should be treated
as a newly created copyrightable expression of those ideas and "[should thus]
rise to the level of more complex choreography as contemplated by the
21
statute." 1
Though a sufficiently complex sports celebration move should most
certainly survive the rigors of the idea/expression dichotomy, it must still
2 12
satisfy the "functionality test."
ii. Useful Articles: Functional v. Non-Functional
The functionality of useful articles serves as, yet, another restriction on
works seeking copyright protection. 2 13 According to the functionality doctrine
applied in Fabrica Inc. v. El Dorado Corp., "if an article has any intrinsic
utilitarian function, it can be denied copyright protection except to the extent
that its artistic features can be identified separately and are capable of existing
' 2 14
independently as a work of art."
Ordinary sports moves, like the "method or process for throwing a pitch in
baseball... or.. .performing more accurate putts," may be categorized as
2 16
purely functional 21 5 and may, therefore, be denied copyright protection.

208. Stevenson, supra note 43.
209. Weber, supra note 21, at 357 (citing Compendium II § 450.01 (1984)).
210. Id.(citing Compendium II § 450.01).
211. Id. (quoting Robert M. Kunstadt et al., Recent Patent Copyright & Trademark Law Dev't
could suggest Novel IP uses, NAT'L L. J., May 20, 1996, at C2).
212. See Fabrica,697 F.2d at 893; see § 101.
213. § 101 (defining "useful article").
214. Fabrica,697 F.2d at 893; see § 101.
215. Weber, supra note 21, at 360.
216. See Fabrica,697 F.2d at 890 (affirming the lower court's holding that copyright law did not
protect folders because they were completely utilitarian).
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However, sports celebration moves are more expressive, creative, and only
tangentially related to the goals of a particular game. And would, therefore,
most likely clear this hurdle to copyright.
To better understand this principle, one might contrast
an athlete's movements in pursuit of scoring a touchdown in a football
game with his movements in celebration of having scored (for
example, while performing a [sports celebration move]). The former
movements seem to be primarily functional in nature, since their chief
purpose is the scoring of a touchdown and, ultimately, the winning of
a game, whereas the [sports celebration move] seems purely
217
expressive and irrelevant to the goal of winning.
Further, it has been argued that "sports are inherently nonfunctional...
[and thus] functionality should not be seen to exclude any sports moves from
copyright protection." 2 18 Regardless of whether all sport moves should be
copyrightable, purely expressive sports celebration moves should certainly not
be hampered by the functionality doctrine, because they serve very little or no
2 19
functional purpose to an athletic event.
Although it seems as if the more complex sports celebration moves will
survive the many hurdles provided by copyright law, public policy must still
be considered. Because the purpose of copyright is focused intently on
advancing the public welfare, public opinion provides a final, lofty hurdle that
sports celebration moves must endure.
(d) Public Policy Considerations
There are three policy considerations that are often addressed when
discussing the copyrightability of sports moves in general: (1) "Copyright for
sports moves is superfluous, since powerful incentives for creative athleticism
already exist[;] ' 2 20 (2) "Copyright for sports moves will destroy competition
by reducing the pool of available moves[;] ' 22 1 and (3) "Copyright for sports
move[s] will harm competition by preventing the general use of future-created
moves[.] ' '222 In addition to these three policy considerations, many also make
223
a fourth argument; that sports celebration moves taint the purity of sport.

217. Weber, supranote 21, at 358.
218. Id. at359.
219. See id. at 358.
220. Id. at 333.
221. Id. at 336.
222. Id.at338.
223. See, e.g., David Sean Brennan, Sanctity of Sport, INST.

FOR INT'L SPORT, at
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These are all valid concerns when discussing the copyrightability of ordinary sports moves.
However, as explained above, sports celebration moves, though generally related to sports
moves, can be considered for purposes of copyright protection an entirely different species of
sports moves. Sports celebration moves, unlike ordinary sports moves, are purely expressive
acts, individualized by the influence of the respective competitor's persona. Nevertheless, this
comment will address each policy argument.

The first policy consideration involves the issue of already existent
incentives for athletes. 224 It is argued that, "a given move's potential value in
the winning of a contest already provides a strong incentive for creativity
completely independent from.., that provided by the prospect of
copyright. ' '22 5 However, sports celebration moves do not contribute directly
to the outcome of a game. 22 6 Instead, they add to the creativity and excitement
of an athletic contest, serving merely as expressions of each athlete's emotions
while in the heat of battle. Therefore, the argument that there is already an
incentive-an incentive to win-is not a compelling argument against
copyright protection when applied to sports celebration moves.
Moreover, neither argument (2) nor (3) are convincing in this case. Both
arguments address the concern that protecting sports moves with copyright
will hamper current and future creativity.
They further assert that
copyrighting sports moves will create a virtual monopoly on present moves,
227
greatly reducing the pool of moves in the future.
While this may be a valid concern for ordinary sports moves, again, it is
not so for sports celebration moves. There exist an infinite number of dance
steps, gesticulations, gyrations, shimmies, sways, and other expressive moves
22 8
that an athlete can combine to make a unique sports celebration move.
Finally, many argue that these celebratory dances detract from the
sportsmanship and purity of sport. 229 It is agreed that any move performed to
intentionally and openly embarrass or mock a competitor detracts from the
sanctity of sport and, therefore, has no place in sport. Sports celebration
http://www.sportsparenting.org/nsd/nsd-articles.cfm (last visited Oct. 4, 2003); Beeb Salzer, OUR
HEROES: Today, It's the Bully, Not Strong Silent Type, SAN DIEGO UNTON-TRIB., (Aug. 14, 2003), at
B-9:2,7, available at http://www.sportsparenting.org/nsd/nsdarticles.cfm#l; Jensen, supra note 39.
224. Weber, supra note 21, at 333-34.
225. Id. at 334.
226. See id.at 358.
227. See id.at 339.
228. "Throughout the league now, players are dreaming up interesting ways to cap off a long

drive or an amazing play, allowing an array of body parts to groove and gyrate to the delight of
teammates and fans. The phenomenon isn't a new one, but [there has been] an influx of celebrations
that exude a wide range of emotions." Jensen, supra note 43.
229. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 222; Salzer, supra note 222; Jensen, supra note 43.
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moves should only be performed after the play, away from competitors.
Further, they should be used simply to celebrate a great play, to draw attention
to an athlete's superior skills, and to excite the crowd. 230
Performed
respectfully, not at the competitors' expense, these moves can add great
entertainment value and excitement to sport. 23 1
Moreover, excessive
celebration rules are already in place to ensure that sports celebration moves
do not detract from the sportsmanship of the game. 232 Though the battle
between purists and non-traditionalists over this issue is sure to continue,
resolution to this conflict will ultimately be decided by the market place.
IV. CONCLUSION
After thorough analysis, the question of whether a sports celebration move
is copyrightable has been answered. It is asserted that sports celebration
moves are copyrightable for the following reasons: (1) The purpose for
protecting sports celebration moves is consistent with the purposes of
copyright; (2) these moves almost certainly satisfy the Copyright Act's first
two requirements of "originality" and "fixation;" (3) whether they are
considered, for the purpose of copyright protection, as "sports moves" or as
"choreographic works," many of the complex sports celebration moves would
survive the obstacles of the idea/expression dichotomy and the doctrine of
functionality. Thus, the more complex sports celebration moves would most
likely satisfy the third and final requirement, namely, that they fall within the
required subject matter of copyright; and lastly, (4) the policy considerations,
which might have merit in weighing against ordinary sports moves, are mostly
misdirected in regards to athlete celebration moves.
Most athletes have not pursued copyright protection for their sports
celebration moves to date. However, this is perhaps only because athletes
previously had far fewer opportunities to profit from the heightened media
exposure that surrounds sport than athletes have today. Copyright protection
of athletes' sports celebration moves is now crucial because it prospectively
allows athletes to prohibit other competitors from exploiting, claiming rights
to, or diluting the novelty of their sports celebration moves, which have the
potential to enhance their marketability, their market power, and thus their
earning potential.
Henry M. Abromson

230. See Jensen, supra note 139.
231. See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 139; Jensen, supra note 43.
232. See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 139; Jensen, supra note 43.

